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Abstract
On 15 April 2019, the Florence Competition Programme (FCP) organ-
ised its third Advanced Competition Seminar in the context of the 
2018/2019 edition of the FCP Annual Training. The seminar focused 
on the analysis of the main innovation-related theories of harm elabo-
rated in the field of EU merger control, taking into account that the 
current debate on the matter revolves around the opportunity to 
change the legal framework in domains where innovation represents 
a crucial competitive dimension. In particular, speakers observed that 
the topic is increasingly attracting policy makers’ attention, since we 
are currently witnessing an important consolidation wave, especially 
in the digital industries, in the USA and, to some extent, in the EU, 
too. Furthermore, the discussion shed light on the fact that, besides 
stimulating growth and technological change, innovation is being 
perceived as an antidote to the accumulation of market power, which 
is becoming a key parameter of competition in policy discourse and, 
as a result, it spurred heated discussions on its future evolution. As a 
matter of fact, while the analytical apparatus for standard price effects 
has been developed extensively throughout the European Commis-
sion’s case practice, there exists a substantial lack of both theoretical 
models and scientific tools that can be used in the assessment of anti-
competitive harm when innovation is at stake.
After introducing the subject, speakers pointed out that innovation 
competition assessments under EU merger control are increasingly 
featuring a progressive detachment from actual product market sce-
narios. With reference to horizontal mergers that take place in tra-
ditional industries, in particular, they observed that, in the first type 
of cases, the main effect attributable to the transaction would be a 
reduction in the competitive force created through innovation. These 
mergers typically involve the late pipeline products of one merging 
party which overlap with the existing (‘pipeline to existing’) or pipe-
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line (‘pipeline to pipeline’) products of the other party. 
In this respect, it is worth clarifying that, in relying on 
a sound legal framework1, the European Commission 
has adopted an approach that is capable of extending 
the assessment of anticompetitive effects to those firms 
that are not actually present in a given existing product 
market at the same time, but which can be regarded as 
being ‘potential’ competitors, as well as to firms that are 
both about to enter a given product market. Such an 
assessment does not seem to differ substantially from one 
involving existing products. In these cases, notably, static 
unilateral effects upon prices should be expected, mainly 
due to the internalization of negative price externalities.2 
Notably, it revolves around two conditions that have to 
be met in order to conclude that the transaction with a 
potential competitor would produce significant anti-
competitive effects: first, the potential competitor should 
already exert a significant constraining influence or, as 
an option, it must be sufficiently likely that it will grow 
into an effective competitive force (‘degree of closeness of 
competition’); furthermore, there must not be a sufficient 
number of other potential competitors (‘extent of external 
product rivalry’), otherwise adequate competitive pres-
sure will be maintained in the post-merger phase. Impor-
tantly, late pipeline products can be regarded as products 
that, being very close to a commercialization launch, are 
at an advanced stage of development, typically in Phase 
III of clinical research in the pharmaceutical industry, 
and that present a high chance of being introduced into 
the market on a time horizon of two or three years.3
In a second category of cases, horizontal mergers may have 
a direct impact on the innovation efforts put into the early 
overlapping pipeline products of the merging parties as, 
after the completion of the transaction, the R&D projects 
of the merging firms may cannibalize each other, with 
the major result being that one project is discontinued 
so as to avoid the internalization of negative ‘innovation’ 
1. See EU Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers un-
der the Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations 
between Undertakings, OJ C 31, 05.02.2004.
2.  Several cases of this type involve pharmaceuticals or medical 
devices. One of the most prominent examples is the case Pfizer/
Hospira, European Commission, Decision in Case No COM-
P/M.7559 of 4 August 2015, in which the merging parties were 
required to divest Pfizer’s late-stage biosimilar pipeline product, 
which was very likely to become a significant competitive force 
against the product marketed by Hospira.
3.  EC’s case practice has shown that such a time horizon may be 
even shorter.
externalities, featuring a case of ‘internal product rivalry’.4 
The core assumption of the Commission’s assessment, in 
these cases, is that standard unilateral effects analysis 
can be extended from prices to innovation. Its under-
lying logic can be traced back to the idea that increased 
concentration is presumed to produce a negative impact 
upon innovation, provided that no redeeming efficiencies 
exist. However, unlike the case of a merger with a poten-
tial competitor who has pipeline products that are close to 
market launch, here, the assessment is clearly unlinked to 
an actual product market scenario, since there are only a 
few chances that one of the firms (or even both) will enter 
it. Targeting innovation at such an early stage, that is, at 
the early R&D efforts of the parties which have not yet 
taken the shape of concrete products, or that do not yet 
have a high probability of successful commercialisation, 
such an approach appears to be quite speculative; indeed, 
it has to deal with a remarkable amount of uncertainty. Its 
most significant elements encompass the ascertainment 
of: (i) the strength of future competitors, and (ii) the like-
lihood of success of the firms’ R&D plans. Significantly 
the time horizon to be taken as a point of reference is 
much longer than that which is usual (from six or seven 
to ten years) and typically refer to Phases I or II of clinical 
research projects.
Since the very well-known Dow/Dupont merger decision5, 
the Commission has developed a peculiar approach that, 
in the policy debate, has come to be known as the inno-
vation theory of harm (IToH), in which the focus of the 
unilateral effect analysis tends to shift from short-term 
static effects on prices to longer-term dynamic effects on 
innovation, showing an impact, usually regarded as being 
negative, that may occur even in the absence of any direct 
4. Such a reasoning is fully reflected in another pharmaceutical 
merger: in Novartis/GlaxoSmithKline’s oncology business, Euro-
pean Commission, Decision in case No COMP/M.7275, 28 Jan-
uary, 2015, early pipeline products with success probabilities of 
less than 50% were included into the analysis, and the overlap 
was not between a current product and a potential product, but 
between two potential products.
5.  See Dow/DuPont, European Commission, Commission decision 
in Case M.7932, 27 March 2017. Notably, according to the Com-
mission, “the merger between [two firms] will result in internal-
ization by each merging party of the adverse effect of the R&D 
projects on […] the other merging party; hence, […] it will re-
duce investment in the competing R&D projects. The innovation 
competition effect [of a merger] follows the basic logic of unilat-
eral effects, which is equally applicable to product market com-
petition and to innovation competition” (Annex 4, para 145). 
Similar features can be observed in other cases, such as Bayer/
Monsanto, European Commission, Decision in Case M.8084, 21 
March 2018.
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link with current or future product markets. This theory 
mainly relies on the major assumption that product mar-
kets may not fully capture all the possible dimensions in 
which firms can compete, taking innovation itself as a 
point of reference. Against this backdrop, even externali-
ties would need to be placed in a different and broader 
context, that is, the innovation industry as a whole, since 
it is not possible to limit them to a specific research area. 
In this respect, speakers remarked that the topic is not 
totally new: starting from the mid-90’s, it generated sev-
eral discussions in the USA. Fascinating theses setting 
up ad-hoc analytical frameworks for the assessment of 
dynamic mergers effects have been developed under the 
label of competition in innovation ‘markets’ (Gilbert and 
Sunshine, 1995)6 whose scope of application, however, 
was subject to the existence of an effect attributable to 
specific R&D activities in a given product market. Elabo-
rating on these thoughts, the theoretical underpinnings of 
the novel IToH for the EU merger control policy revisits 
the traditional analysis of competition innovation pro-
foundly. This is reflected in a strand of merger decisions 
that has culminated in the Dow/Dupont case, in which 
the Commission shifted the focus of its merger analysis 
from product pipelines to innovation ‘spaces’. In par-
ticular, the core of the competition assessment revolved 
around the questions of whether a merger can produce 
the effect of: (i) increasing the firms’ incentives to shut 
down their R&D projects which target the same innova-
tion spaces, featuring cannibalisation7; (ii) decreasing the 
merging firms’ incentives to initiate new innovation pro-
jects; (iii) decreasing the whole industry’s incentives to 
initiate new innovation projects.
Then, speakers held that although the relationship 
between competition and innovation has been exten-
sively explored by the economic literature, results may 
be considered elusive and thus far from the elaboration 
of a general IToH. On the enforcement side, this is a 
valid reason for justifying the antitrust authorities’ atti-
tude, which have so far adopted a cautious approach, 
mainly limiting their intervention to cases in which the 
merging firms’ innovative products are very close to the 
6. R. J. Gilbert and S. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiencies 
Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets, An-
titrust Law Journal, 1995, Vol. 63, No. 2, pp. 569-601.
7. On this point, the Commission has specified that it “may not be 
able to identify precisely which early pipeline products or lines 
of research the parties would likely discontinue, defer or even 
re-direct”. Dow/DuPont, cit., para 3025.
commercialization stage.8 In particular, according to an 
important strand of the current debate that has critically 
assessed the IToH, the analysis of the conditions under 
which horizontal mergers would necessarily reduce inno-
vation, in the absence of specific synergies in research, 
overlook important economic effects. In this respect, it is 
worth remarking that under one of the most prominent 
models that considers the impact of mergers between 
firms competing in research, the duplication of the same 
innovations, or the innovations that are close substitutes 
for each other, leads to negative externalities that are 
always internalized through a contraction of the R&D 
efforts9. However, the analysis relies on the assumption 
that the merged firm spreads its R&D expenditure evenly 
across its research units. The two hypotheses elaborated 
in this respect, that is, that firms are ex-ante symmetric 
and that returns for R&D diminish, do not appear to be 
sufficient. In order to be valid, the model requires that 
returns for R&D decrease sufficiently fast. In the absence 
of this stronger condition, a better coordination of the 
R&D activity of the merged firm’s research units may well 
increase the total level of R&D investment and the rate of 
innovation.10 
Furthermore, it was observed that there exists another 
mechanism through which mergers can spur innova-
tion. The concept of incremental innovations refers to 
a series of small improvements made by a firm for the 
purpose of improving an existing product’s development 
efficiency, productivity and competitive differentiation, 
which lead to cost reductions, quality improvements, 
or a combination of the two effects. Within this frame-
work, as the value of incremental innovations is propor-
tional to the output level to which they are applied, at a 
first approximation, the impact of mergers on innovation 
would depend on their impact on output levels. Once the 
8. V. Denicolò and M. Polo, The Innovation Theory of Harm: An 
Appraisal, Antitrust Law Journal, 2019, Vol. 82, pp. 926-953.
9. The main reference is to G. Federico, G. Langus and T. Valletti, 
Horizontal Mergers and Product Innovation, International Jour-
nal of Industrial Organization, July 2018, Vol. 59, pp. 1-23, which 
is often regarded as providing the theoretical underpinning of 
the IToH. The paper has been published in different versions 
in the years 2017-2018. See also, G. Federico, G. Langus and T. 
Valletti, A Simple Model of Mergers and Innovation, Economics 
Letters, 2017, Vol. 157, issue C, pp. 136-140; and G. Federico, Hor-
izontal Mergers, Innovation and the Competitive Process, Journal 
of European Competition Law & Practice, December 2017, Vol. 
8, Issue 10, pp. 668-677.
10. On this point, see V. Denicolò and M. Polo, Duplicative Research, 
Merger and Innovation, Economics Letters, 2018, Vol. 166, Issue 
C, pp. 56-59.
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merged firm becomes larger, therefore it can apply the 
innovations it has achieved to a greater volume of output, 
which increases the value of the merged firm’s innova-
tions and its incentives to innovate, even in the absence 
of static production synergies. Such a mechanism rests 
on the premise that the innovations should be non-rival, 
that is, that they are applicable across the various plants of 
the merging firms. It also assumes that the firm becomes 
larger than any of the merging firms, and that it facilitates 
the sharing process of innovative technological knowl-
edge. Besides acknowledging that some models arguing 
that mergers always decrease R&D investments take into 
consideration only innovations that are entirely firm-spe-
cific, ruling out the possibility of any innovation sharing11, 
which seems unrealistic, speakers concluded that, at the 
present time, economic analysis does not seem to support 
the claim that horizontal mergers always reduce innova-
tion, or that they increase innovation only in exceptional 
circumstances. If it is possible to conceive of mechanisms 
that are capable of generating an increase in the incen-
tives to innovate, such as the coordination of R&D pro-
jects within a model of ‘radical’ innovations, as well as the 
sharing of new technological knowledge within a model 
of incremental innovations12, amongst others, the ulti-
mate question about whether mergers are more likely to 
either hamper or spur innovation seems to be an empir-
ical one. However, not even the empirical evidence that is 
available in this respect seems to be conclusive. All in all, 
the underpinnings of the IToH adopted by the European 
Commission are too fragile to represent the basis for rad-
ical policy changes that may risk blocking several pro-
competitive mergers. In light of this, while considering 
the impact of horizontal mergers on dynamic efficiencies, 
one should bear in mind, from the outset, that effects can 
be either positive or negative, and that these effects have 
to be balanced in light of the facts of the specific case at 
stake. 
Finally, as for the digital industries, in which competition 
‘in’ the market is typically limited, a number of speakers 
remarked on the importance of merger control as a key 
tool for preserving competition ‘for’ the market. Here, 
11. The reference is to the baseline model with no efficiencies that 
has been developed by another major contribution to the aca-
demic discussions on the matter that are provided by M. Motta 
and E. Tarantino, The Effect of a Merger on Investments, CEPR 
Discussion Papers 11550, 2016. 
12. In this respect, it is worth remarking that innovation sharing 
may also be relevant for radical innovations that create an en-
tirely new product or open a new market.
in the absence of a substantial line of case practice, the 
most relevant strands of the policy debate, which revolve 
around the elaboration of new innovation-related theo-
ries of harm, focus on conglomerate effects. Such contri-
butions highlight concerns similar to those observed in 
traditional industries, dealing with the dynamic assess-
ment of the impact of mergers on innovation markets, 
and, therefore emphasizing the effects of the internali-
zation of negative externalities. At the same time, it is 
possible to detect an increasing attention which is being 
directed at the anticompetitive effects that are attribut-
able to the internalization of positive externalities, since it 
seems to simultaneously increase the value for consumers 
and raise the barriers to entry.
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